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A Collision Attack on a Double-Block-Length Compression
Function Instantiated with 8-/9-Round AES-256∗
Jiageng CHEN†, Shoichi HIROSE††a), Members, Hidenori KUWAKADO†††, Senior Member,
and Atsuko MIYAJI††††,†††††,††††††, Member
SUMMARY This paper presents the first non-trivial collision attack on
the double-block-length compression function presented at FSE 2006 in-
stantiated with round-reduced AES-256: f0(h0∥h1, M)∥ f1(h0∥h1, M) such
that
f0(h0∥h1, M) = Eh1∥M(h0) ⊕ h0 ,
f1(h0∥h1, M) = Eh1∥M(h0 ⊕ c) ⊕ h0 ⊕ c ,
where ∥ represents concatenation, E is AES-256 and c is a 16-byte non-
zero constant. The proposed attack is a free-start collision attack using the
rebound attack proposed by Mendel et al. The success of the proposed
attack largely depends on the configuration of the constant c: the number
of its non-zero bytes and their positions. For the instantiation with AES-
256 reduced from 14 rounds to 8 rounds, it is eﬀective if the constant c
has at most four non-zero bytes at some specific positions, and the time
complexity is 264 or 296. For the instantiation with AES-256 reduced to
9 rounds, it is eﬀective if the constant c has four non-zero bytes at some
specific positions, and the time complexity is 2120. The space complexity
is negligible in both cases.
key words: double-block-length compression function, free-start collision
attack, rebound attack, AES-256
1. Introduction
(1) Background.
Cryptographic hash functions are very important primitives
and used in almost all cryptographic protocols. They are
often called hash functions, and we follow this convention.
There are several design strategies of hash functions,
and the most popular ones are block-cipher-based and
permutation-based. The block-cipher-based approach is
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much more classical than the permutation-based approach.
The permutation-based approach is fairly new, and the SHA-
3 Keccak [4] is designed with the approach. Well-known
hash functions such as MD5 [36], SHA-1 and SHA-2 [14]
can be regarded as being designed with the block-cipher-
based approach using dedicated block ciphers. Hash func-
tions MDC-2 and MDC-4 [8] using DES predate them.
How to construct secure hash functions using a block
cipher has been an important research topic [6], [33]. When
using existing block ciphers such as AES, one should adopt
double-block-length construction [8], [17], [18], [24], [31]
for suﬃcient level of collision-resistance. Hash functions
using AES [11], [15] may be an option for high-end CPUs
with AES-NI and low-end microcontrollers.
(2) Our Contribution.
This paper presents a non-trivial collision attack on the
double-block-length (DBL) compression function [18] in-
stantiated with round-reduced AES-256. As far as
the authors know, this is the first collision attack
on the DBL compression function instantiated with
AES-256. The DBL compression function is defined as
f0(h0∥h1, M)∥ f1(h0∥h1, M) such that
f0(h0∥h1, M) = Eh1∥M(h0) ⊕ h0 ,
f1(h0∥h1, M) = Eh1∥M(h0 ⊕ c) ⊕ h0 ⊕ c ,
where ∥ represents concatenation, E is AES-256 and c is a
non-zero constant. The proposed collision attack assumes
that the final round of round-reduced AES-256 does not
have the MixColumns operation.
The proposed collision attack makes use of the follow-
ing fact [9]: if (h0∥h1, M) and ((h0⊕c)∥h1, M) are a colliding
pair for f0, then they are also a colliding pair for f1. The re-
bound attack [25] is used to find such a colliding pair for
f0. Thus, its success largely depends on the configuration of
the 16-byte constant c: the number of its non-zero bytes and
their positions. For the instantiation with 8-round AES-256,
the attack finds a colliding pair of inputs with time com-
plexity 264 or 296 if the constant c has at most four non-zero
bytes at some specific positions. For the instantiation with 9-
round AES-256, it finds a colliding pair of inputs with time
complexity 2120 if the constant c has four non-zero bytes at
some specific positions. The space complexity is negligible
in both cases.
Copyright c⃝ 2016 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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(3) Related Work.
The rebound attack was proposed by Mendel et al. [30],
and was applied to the hash functions Whirlpool [34] and
Grøstl [21], which have similar structure to AES. The re-
bound attack on Whirlpool was further improved by Lam-
berger et al. [25]. The rebound attack was also applied to a
few other SHA-3 finalists [12], [20], [35].
There is some work on cryptanalyses of single-block-
length hashing modes of AES. Biryukov, Khovratovich
and Nikolic´ [5] presented a q-multicollision attack on the
Davies-Meyer (DM) compression function instantiated with
full-round AES-256. It is very powerful and its time com-
plexity is q · 267. Mendel et al. [29] presented a collision
attack on the DM compression function instantiated with 5-
round AES-128 with time complexity 256. The collision at-
tack on 5.5-round Whirlpool [25] can easily be extended to
a collision attack on the DM, Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO),
Miyaguchi-Preneel (MP) compression functions instanti-
ated with 6-round AES-128 or the DM compression func-
tion instantiated with 6-round AES-192/256. Its time com-
plexity is 256. Jean, Naya-Plasencia and Peyrin [19] pre-
sented a collision attack on the DM compression function
instantiated with 6-round AES-128 with time complexity
232. Sasaki presented preimage and second-preimage at-
tacks on DM, MMO and MP modes of 7-round AES [37].
There is little work on cryptanalyses of instantiations
of DBL hashing modes. Ferguson [13] presented a few
generic attacks on H-PRESENT-128 [7]. Kobayashi and Hi-
rose [22] presented a collision attack on H-PRESENT-128
instantiated with 10-round PRESENT with time complexity
260. Wei et al. [38] presented collision and preimage attacks
on various hashing modes instantiated with the block cipher
IDEA [23]. They concluded that IDEA should not be used
for hashing. The hashing modes include the DBL modes
such as Abreast-DM, Tandem-DM [24], the mode by Hi-
rose [18], the mode by Peyrin et al. [32] and MJH [27]. Our
proposed collision attack is unlikely to be applied to them
except for the Hirose mode.
The collision resistance and the preimage resistance
were provided proofs in the ideal cipher model for Abreast-
DM [3], [16], [26], Tandem-DM [3], [28], the Hirose com-
pression function [3], [18]. In particular, Abreast-DM and
the Hirose compression function were shown to be opti-
mally collision-resistant in the ideal cipher model.
Chang [9] pointed out that, for the Hirose compres-
sion function, the constant c can be used as a backdoor by
first constructing a collision for f0 such that f0(h0∥h1, M) =
f0(h′0∥h1, M) with complexity of 264 and then choosing c =
h0 ⊕ h′0. Attacks in the similar setting have recently been
proposed for SHA-1 [1] and GOST [2].
(4) Organization.
A brief description of AES is given in Sect. 2. An overview
of the proposed collision attack on the DBL compression
function is described in Sect. 3. The collision attacks on
the compression function instantiated with AES-256 of 8
rounds and 9 rounds are detailed in Sect. 4 and Sect. 5, re-
spectively. A concluding remark is given in Sect. 6.
2. Preliminaries
2.1 AES
This section gives a description of AES [11], [15] together
with some properties of its components necessary for the
discussions later.
AES is a block cipher with 128-bit block length and
128/192/256-bit key length. AES with κ-bit key length is
often denoted by AES-κ.
The transformations of AES are performed on a (4 ×
4)-byte array called the state. Each byte is regarded as an
element in GF(28). Multiplication is performed modulo x8+
x4 + x3 + x + 1. The state is initially a plaintext.
The encryption of AES consists of four trans-
formations: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and
AddRoundKey. It starts with the AddRoundKey transforma-
tion followed by iteration of a round function. The round
function applies SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and
AddRoundKey transformations in this order to the state. The
final round does not have the MixColumns transformation.
AES-128/192/256 have 10/12/14 rounds, respectively.
The SubBytes transformation is byte-wise application
of the nonlinear S-box function. For the S-box S, an input x
satisfying the equation S(x) ⊕ S(x ⊕ ∆I) = ∆O is called an
admissible input for the pair of an input diﬀerence ∆I and an
output diﬀerence ∆O. We will say that an input diﬀerence
and an output diﬀerence are compatible with each other if
there exist admissible inputs for the pair.
Table 1 shows the numbers of the pairs of input and
output diﬀerences which have the specified numbers of ad-
missible inputs. The probability that there exist any admissi-
ble inputs for a pair of input and output diﬀerences (∆I,∆O)
chosen uniformly at random is about 1/2. An admissible
input of the SubBytes transformation is defined similarly.
The ShiftRows transformation is byte-wise cyclic
transposition of each row. It shifts the i-th row by i-bytes
cyclically to left for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3.
The MixColumns transformation is linear transforma-
tion of each column. It can be represented with a matrix.
For a 4-byte column b of a state, it is represented by Tb,
where
T =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
02 03 01 01
01 02 03 01
01 01 02 03
03 01 01 02
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ and
Table 1 Correspondence between the number of input-/output-
diﬀerence pairs and the number of their admissible inputs for the AES
S-box.
No. of admissible inputs 0 2 4 256
No. of diﬀerence pairs 33150 32130 255 1
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T−1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0e 0b 0d 09
09 0e 0b 0d
0d 09 0e 0b
0b 0d 09 0e
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
The AddRoundKey transformation is bitwise XOR of
a round key to a state. The round keys are generated by a
key expansion algorithm. The round keys of AES-256 are
generated in the following way. Let (4× 4)-byte array Kr be
the round key of the r-th round for r ≥ 0, where K0 is for the
initial AddRoundKey transformation. The 256-bit key input
is given to K0 and K1. Let Kr[ j] be the j-th column of Kr
for 0 ≤ j ≤ 3. For r ≥ 2, if r is even, then
Kr[0] = Kr−2[0] ⊕ SW(Kr−1[3]↑) ⊕Cr ,
Kr[ j] = Kr−2[ j] ⊕ Kr[ j − 1] for 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 ,
where SW represents byte-wise application of the AES S-
box, Kr−1[3]↑ represents cyclic 1-byte shift of Kr−1[3] to the
top, and Cr is a specified constant. If r is odd, then
Kr[0] = Kr−2[0] ⊕ SW(Kr−1[3]) ,
Kr[ j] = Kr−2[ j] ⊕ Kr[ j − 1] for 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 .
For simplicity, the transformations SubBytes,
ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey are denoted
by SB, SR, MC and AK, respectively.
The state in the r-th round is denoted by S r. S SBr ,
S SRr , S MCr and S AKr represent the state S r just after SB, SR,
MC and AK transformations, respectively. S −1 represents a
plaintext input.
For 0 ≤ i ≤ 3 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 3, S r[i][ j] represents
the byte of S r in the i-th row and the j-th column. S r[ j]
represents the j-th column of S r.
3. Overview
This section gives an overview of the proposed free-start
collision attack on a DBL compression function [18] instan-
tiated with round-reduced AES-256. The target DBL com-
pression function
v0∥v1 = F(h0∥h1, M) = f0(h0∥h1, M)∥ f1(h0∥h1, M)
is defined by
f0(h0∥h1, M) = Eh1∥M(h0) ⊕ h0 ,
f1(h0∥h1, M) = Eh1∥M(h0 ⊕ c) ⊕ h0 ⊕ c ,
where ∥ represents concatenation, E is a block cipher and c
is a non-zero constant. F is depicted in Fig. 1.
A free-start collision attack on a compression function
is successful if it simply finds a colliding pair of inputs of
the compression function, that is, a pair of distinct inputs
mapped to the same output.
To find a collision of F, the proposed attack uses the
following fact [9]:
Fact 1: Suppose that a collision for f0 is caused by
Fig. 1 The target DBL compression function. c is a non-zero constant
and E is a block cipher.
(h0∥h1, M) and ((h0 ⊕ ∆h0)∥h1, M), that is, f0(h0∥h1, M) =
f0((h0 ⊕ ∆h0)∥h1, M) and that ∆h0 = c. Then, a collision for
f1 is also caused by (h0∥h1, M) and ((h0 ⊕ ∆h0)∥h1, M).
The algorithm of the collision attack on F is given be-
low:
1. Find a colliding pair of inputs (h0∥h1, M) and ((h0 ⊕
∆h0)∥h1, M) for f0.
2. Output (h0∥h1, M) and ((h0 ⊕ ∆h0)∥h1, M) if ∆h0 = c.
Otherwise, return to Step 1.
The first step returns a colliding pair of inputs for f0 such
that the non-zero bytes of ∆h0 are located at the same posi-
tions as the non-zero bytes of the constant c. Sections 4 and
5 present how the collision attack is applied to F instantiated
with AES-256 of 8 and 9 rounds, respectively.
4. Collision Attack on Instantiation with 8-Round
AES-256
This section first presents a free-start collision attack on f0
instantiated with 8-round AES-256. It returns a pair of col-
liding inputs with diﬀerence ∆h0 whose bytes are zero ex-
cept for the first byte. The time complexity is 256, and the
space complexity is negligible. The probability that ∆h0 = c
is 2−8 if c has a single non-zero byte at the same position as
the non-zero byte of ∆h0. Thus, the total time complexity of
the collision attack on F instantiated with 8-round AES-256
is 264.
This section also shows by an exhaustive search that
the attack mentioned above can be extended to apply to other
constants c with at most four non-zero bytes at some specific
positions.
4.1 Collision Attack on f0
The collision attack on f0 is based on the rebound attack
on the 7.5-round Whirlpool compression function by Lam-
berger et al. [25]. The goal of the attack is to find a pair of
inputs, (h0∥h1, M) and (h′0∥h1, M), which follow the diﬀer-
ential path given in Fig. 2.
The proposed attack uses two inbound phases: the first
one is in the second and the third rounds, and the second
one is in the fifth and the sixth rounds. The algorithm of the
attack is described below. It first selects the values of diﬀer-
ences of the two inbounds (Steps 1 and 2) and those between
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Fig. 2 The diﬀerential path used by the collision attack on the compres-
sion function f0 instantiated with 8-round AES-256. Colored bytes are
non-zero diﬀerences.
the two inbounds (Step 3). Then, for each pair of an admis-
sible input of SB in the third round and that of SB in the
sixth round, it connects them with the round keys (Steps 4a
to 4c), and extends the state transformation to the outbounds
to check if a colliding pair of inputs are obtained (Steps 4d
to 4f).
1. This step looks for a pair of compatible input/output
diﬀerences of SubBytes of the third round in the fol-
lowing way:
a. Select the non-zero diﬀerences in ∆S SR2 and
∆S AK3 = ∆S
MC
3 uniformly at random. Then, com-
pute
∆S AK2 = ∆S
MC
2 = MC(∆S SR2 ) ,
∆S SB3 = SR
−1(MC−1(∆S MC3 )) .
For linear transformations, output diﬀerences are
uniquely determined only by the input diﬀer-
ences.
b. If there are no admissible inputs for the pair of
∆S AK2 and ∆S
SB
3 , then return to Step 1a.
The expected number of repetitions of this step is 216.
The number of admissible inputs obtained for S AK2 with
this step is 216. Actually, this step can be made more
eﬃcient since the trials can be done column by column.
However, this speed-up does not change the time com-
plexity of the overall algorithm.
2. This step looks for a pair of compatible input/output
diﬀerences of SubBytes of the sixth round in the same
way as the step 1. 216 admissible inputs are obtained
for S AK5 with this step.
3. Select ∆S SB4 compatible with ∆S
AK
3 uniformly at ran-
dom until ∆S AK4 = ∆S
MC
4 = MC(SR(∆S SB4 )) is compat-
ible with ∆S SB5 . The expected number of repetitions of
this step is 24.
4. Perform the following procedure:
a. Select a new pair among the 232 pairs of S AK2 and
S AK5 . If there exists no new pair, then return to
Step 1.
b. Compute S SB3 = SB(S AK2 ). Then, run the algo-
rithm for connecting two inbound phases, which
is given in Sect. 4.2, and obtain the round keys
K3, K4 and K5.
c. Compute the round keys K0, K1, K2, K6 and K7.
d. Compute the corresponding input S −1 to AES and
the diﬀerence ∆S −1 from S AK2 and ∆S AK2 . If any
byte of ∆S −1 other than ∆S −1[0][0] is non-zero,
then return to Step 4a.
e. Compute the corresponding output S AK8 from
AES and the diﬀerence ∆S AK8 from S AK5 and
∆S AK5 . If any byte of ∆S
AK
8 other than ∆S
AK
8 [0][0]
is non-zero, then return to Step 4a.
f. If ∆S −1 = ∆S AK8 , then proceed to Step 5. Other-
wise, return to Step 4a.
5. Output the pair of inputs (K, S −1) and (K, S −1 ⊕∆S −1),
which are mapped to the same hash value by f0 instan-
tiated with 8-round AES-256, where K = K0∥K1.
For Step 4d in the algorithm above, the probability that
only ∆S −1[0][0] is non-zero (the transition from ∆S MC1 to
∆S SR1 is successful) is 2−24. Similarly, for Step 4e, the
probability that only ∆S AK8 [0][0] is non-zero is 2−24. For
Step 4f, the probability that ∆S −1 = ∆S AK8 is 2−8. Thus,
the estimated time complexity of the algorithm above is
224×2+8 = 256.
For Step 1, the number of the pairs of compatible dif-
ferences (∆S AK2 ,∆S SB3 ) is 2554 × 2554 × 2−16 ≈ 248. For
Step 2, the number of the pairs of compatible diﬀerences
(∆S AK5 ,∆S SB6 ) is also 248. For each pair of compatible dif-
ferences (∆S AK2 ,∆S SB3 ) and (∆S AK5 ,∆S SB6 ), the number of the
pairs of admissible inputs S AK2 and S AK5 is 2
32 as mentioned
in Step 4a. Thus, we have in total about 248+48+32 = 2128
candidates for the outbound phase.
4.2 Algorithm to Connect Two Inbound Phases
An algorithm to connect two inbound phases is described
in this section. It gives a pair of sequences of state values
between SB in the third round and SB in the sixth round
whose diﬀerences follow the diﬀerential path in Fig. 2. The
initial and final state values of the sequences are given to the
algorithm as input as well as the values of the diﬀerences.
The algorithm outputs the round keys (K3, K4 and K5) which
connect these values. The algorithm pays specific attention
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to the bytes of states with black circles in Fig. 2. They are
given priority simply because they are bytes with non-zero
diﬀerences.
Input: S SB3 , S
AK
5 , and ∆S
SB
3 , ∆S
SB
4 , ∆S
AK
5 .
Output: Round keys K3, K4 and K5.
Procedure:
1. Compute ∆S AK3 , ∆S
AK
4 and ∆S
SB
5 :
∆S AK3 = ∆S
MC
3 = MC(SR(∆S SB3 ))
∆S AK4 = ∆S
MC
4 = MC(SR(∆S SB4 ))
∆S SB5 = SR
−1(MC−1(∆S MC5 )) ,
where ∆S MC5 = ∆S
AK
5 .
2. Select admissible inputs of the S-boxes with non-zero
diﬀerences of SB in the fourth round: S AK3 [0][3],
S AK3 [1][0], S AK3 [2][1] and S AK3 [3][2].
3. Compute K3[0][3], K3[1][0], K3[2][1] and K3[3][2]
from the corresponding bytes of S MC3 = MC(SR(S SB3 ))
and S AK3 .
4. Select admissible inputs of the S-boxes with non-zero
diﬀerences of SB in the fifth round: S AK4 [3]. Then,
compute S SB5 [3].
5. K4[3] = S MC4 [3] ⊕ S AK4 [3], where S MC4 [3] can be com-
puted from the corresponding bytes of S AK3 .
6. Compute the round key K5 satisfying the conditions
obtained so far. They can be expressed by 8 linear
equations on the bytes of K5, which form an under-
determined and consistent system of linear equations.
They are given in Sect. 4.3.
7. Compute the remaining bytes of K3 from K5 and K4[3].
8. Compute S MC4 and S
AK
4 from S
SB
3 with K3 and from S
AK
5
with K5, respectively. Then, compute K4[ j] = S MC4 [ j]⊕
S AK4 [ j] for 0 ≤ j ≤ 2.
4.3 Conditions on the Round Key K5
The following four conditions are led from the key expan-
sion algorithm:
K5[1][0] = K3[1][0] ⊕ S(K4[1][3])
K5[2][0] ⊕ K5[2][1] = K3[2][1]
K5[3][1] ⊕ K5[3][2] = K3[3][2]
K5[0][2] ⊕ K5[0][3] = K3[0][3] .
Notice that all the bytes of K3 and K4 on the right side are
already fixed by the algorithm.
The other condition comes from the fixed bytes of
S SB5 [3]:
SR(S SB5 [3]) = MC−1(S AK5 )[3] ⊕MC−1(K5)[3] .
Notice that S AK5 is given to the algorithm as input. They can
be expanded to the following four equations:
(0b, 0d, 09, 0e)K5[0] = S SR5 [3][0] ⊕ (0b, 0d, 09, 0e)S AK5 [0]
(0d, 09, 0e, 0b)K5[1] = S SR5 [2][1] ⊕ (0d, 09, 0e, 0b)S AK5 [1]
(09, 0e, 0b, 0d)K5[2] = S SR5 [1][2] ⊕ (09, 0e, 0b, 0d)S AK5 [2]
(0e, 0b, 0d, 09)K5[3] = S SR5 [0][3] ⊕ (0e, 0b, 0d, 09)S AK5 [3] .
4.4 Eﬀectiveness of the Attack
We exhaustively checked the values of constant c against
which the proposed attack is eﬀective. The attack is eﬀective
if and only if its time complexity is smaller than that of the
birthday attack: 2128 in the current case. We will call the
constant c vulnerable if the attack is eﬀective against it.
Vulnerable constants turned out to have at most four
non-zero bytes. Non-zero bytes can have any value from 01
to ff. Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 give all the vulnerable constants
with one, two, three and four non-zero bytes, respectively.
Fig. 3 Vulnerable constants with one non-zero byte. Colored bytes are
non-zero.
Fig. 4 Vulnerable constants with two non-zero bytes. Colored bytes are
non-zero.
Fig. 5 Vulnerable constants with three non-zero bytes. Colored bytes are
non-zero.
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Fig. 6 Vulnerable constants with four non-zero bytes. Colored bytes are
non-zero.
The total number of vulnerable constants is
16 × 255 + 40 × 2552 + 32 × 2553 + 8 × 2554 ≈ 235 .
All the constants with one non-zero byte are vulnera-
ble. Non-zero bytes of the vulnerable constants with two
non-zero bytes are
• c[i][ j] and c[i + 2][ j + 2],
• c[i][ j] and c[i + 1][ j + 1], or
• c[i][ j] and c[i + 1][ j − 1]
for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 3. Non-zero bytes of the vulnera-
ble constants with three non-zero bytes are
• c[i][ j], c[i + 1][ j + 1] and c[i + 2][ j + 2], or
• c[i][ j], c[i + 1][ j − 1] and c[i + 2][ j − 2]
for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 3. Non-zero bytes of the vulnera-
ble constants with four non-zero bytes are
• c[0][ j], c[1][ j + 1], c[2][ j + 2] and c[3][ j + 3], or
• c[0][ j], c[1][ j − 1], c[2][ j − 2] and c[3][ j − 3]
for 0 ≤ j ≤ 3. All the additions above are modulo 4.
The estimated time complexity of the collision attack
on the compression function with any constant
• in Figs. 3 and 4(a) is 264.
• in Figs. 4(b), 5 and 6 is 296.
Two examples of diﬀerential paths for vulnerable con-
stants with two non-zero bytes are given in Fig. 7. It is not
diﬃcult to construct diﬀerential paths for the other vulnera-
ble constants.
For the diﬀerential path in Fig. 7(b), the probability of
the transition from ∆S MC1 to ∆S
SR
1 is 2
−16
. The probability
of the transition from ∆S SR7 to ∆S
MC
7 is 2
−48
. The probability
that ∆S −1 = ∆S AK8 is 2
−16
. The probability that ∆S −1 = c is
also 2−16. Thus, the estimated time complexity of the attack
is 216+48+16+16 = 296.
5. Collision Attack on Instantiation with 9-Round
AES-256
The collision attack on f0 instantiated with 8-round AES-
256 can be extended to the collision attack on f0 instantiated
with 9-round AES-256 for diﬀerent choice of the constant
c. The diﬀerential path used by this attack is presented in
Fig. 8. ∆h0 = ∆S −1 has four non-zero bytes on its diago-
nal. Notice that the diﬀerential path from the third round to
the sixth round is identical to the diﬀerential path from the
second round to the fifth round in Fig. 2.
The first inbound phase of the attack is in the third and
the fourth rounds, and the second one is in the sixth and the
seventh rounds. The algorithm shown in Sect. 4.2 can be
Fig. 7 Examples of diﬀerential paths used by the collision attack on the
compression function with vulnerable constants with two non-zero bytes.
Colored bytes are non-zero diﬀerences. The diﬀerential paths from the
second round to the fifth round are omitted since they are identical to the
diﬀerential path from the second round to the fifth round in Fig. 2.
used to connect these inbound phases and obtain K4, K5 and
K6.
In the outbound phase of the attack, S −1 and ∆S −1 are
computed from S AK3 and ∆S AK3 , and S AK9 and ∆S AK9 are com-
puted from S AK6 and ∆S
AK
6 . For these computations,
• the success probability of the transition from ∆S MC2 to
∆S SR2 is 2
−24
,
• the success probability of the transition from ∆S SR8 to
∆S MC8 is 2
−32
, and
• the probability that ∆S −1 = ∆S AK9 is 2−32.
Thus, the estimated time complexity of the attack is
224+32+32 = 288. Though it is beyond the complexity of the
birthday attack for f0, it is eﬀective for our purpose.
Due to the symmetry of AES, the attack also works
with the same kind of the diﬀerential paths with ∆S −1 such
that the four non-zero bytes of ∆S −1 are
• ∆S −1[0][1], ∆S −1[1][2], ∆S −1[2][3], ∆S −1[3][0],
• ∆S −1[0][2], ∆S −1[1][3], ∆S −1[2][0], ∆S −1[3][1], or
• ∆S −1[0][3], ∆S −1[1][0], ∆S −1[2][1], ∆S −1[3][2].
The total time complexity of the collision attack on F
is 288+32 = 2120 since the probability that ∆h0 = c is 2−32
for constant c which has four non-zero bytes at the same
positions as the non-zero bytes of ∆h0. The total number of
vulnerable constants is 4 × 2554 ≈ 233.98.
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Fig. 8 The diﬀerential path used by the collision attack on the compres-
sion function f0 instantiated with 9-round AES-256. Colored bytes are
non-zero diﬀerences. The diﬀerential path from the third round to the sixth
round is identical to the diﬀerential path from the second round to the fifth
round in Fig. 2.
6. Conclusion
This paper has presented a free-start collision attack on the
DBL compression function [18] instantiated with round-
reduced AES-256. A drawback of the attack is that it is
eﬀective against restricted constants. It is interesting if the
restriction is reduced. It is also interesting to apply the at-
tack to instantiations with other block ciphers.
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